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Abstract
In this paper, we aim to understand and explain the de-
cisions of deep neural networks by studying the behavior of
predicted attributes when adversarial examples are intro-
duced. We study the changes in attributes for clean as well
as adversarial images in both standard and adversarially
robust networks. We propose a metric to quantify the ro-
bustness of an adversarially robust network against adver-
sarial attacks. In a standard network, attributes predicted
for adversarial images are consistent with the wrong class,
while attributes predicted for the clean images are consis-
tent with the true class. In an adversarially robust net-
work, the attributes predicted for adversarial images classi-
fied correctly are consistent with the true class. Finally, we
show that the ability to robustify a network varies for dif-
ferent datasets. For the fine grained dataset, it is higher as
compared to the coarse grained dataset. Additionally, the
ability to robustify a network increases with the increase in
adversarial noise.
1. Introduction
Understanding neural networks is crucial in applications
like autonomous vehicles, health care, robotics, for validat-
ing and debugging, as well as for building the trust of users
[15, 32]. This paper strives to understand and explain the
decisions of deep neural networks by studying the behavior
of predicted attributes when adversarial examples are intro-
duced. We argue that even if no adversaries are being in-
serted in real world applications, adversarial examples can
be exploited for understanding neural networks in their fail-
ure modes. Most of the state of the art approaches for in-
terpreting neural networks work by focusing on features to
produce saliency maps by considering class specific gradi-
ent information [24, 26, 28], or by finding the part of the
image which influences classification the most and remov-
ing it by adding perturbations [34, 10]. These approaches
reveal the part in the image where there is support to the
classification and visualize the performance of known good
examples. This tells a little about the boundaries of a class
                       
Which bird 
is this?
Which bird is this?
   
Painted Bunting.
Because it has attributes:
    
Red Belly
Blue Head
   
Herring Gull
Because it has attributes: 
White Belly
White Head
Red Belly
Blue Head
Painted Bunting.
Because it has attributes:
    
Herring Gull
Because it has attributes:
    
-White Belly
-White Head
Which bird is this?
Which bird is this?
Red belly
Blue head
Black bill
Blue head
Red belly
Green wing
Blue Head
Red Belly
-White Belly
-White HeadNoise
Blue head
Red belly
Green wing
Blue Head
Red Belly
-White Belly
-White Head
Adversarial
Clean Image
Class Attributes
Adversarial Image Clean Image 
Attribute Predictor
Adversarial Image
Clean Image
Figure 1. Our study with interpretable attribute prediction-
grounding framework shows that, for a clean image predicted at-
tributes “red belly” and “blue head” are coherent with the ground
truth class (painted bunting), and for an adversarial image “white
belly” and “white head” are coherent with the wrong class (herring
gull) .
where dubious examples reside.
However, humans motivate their decisions through se-
mantically meaningful observations. For example, this type
of bird has a blue head and red belly so, this must be a
painted bunting. Hence, we study changes in the predicted
attribute values of samples under mild modification of the
image through adversarial perturbations. We believe this
alternative dimension of study can provide a better under-
standing of how misclassification in a deep network can best
be communicated to humans. Note that, we consider adver-
sarial examples that are generated to fool only the classifier
and not the interpretation (attributes) mechanism.
Interpreting deep neural network decisions for adversar-
ial examples helps in understanding their internal function-
ing [30, 9]. Therefore, we explore
How do the attribute values change under an adversarial
attack on the standard classification network?
However while, describing misclassifications due to ad-
versarial examples with attributes helps in understanding
neural networks, assessing whether the attribute values still
retain their discriminative power after making the network
robust to adversarial noise is equally important. Hence, we
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also ask
How do the attribute values change under an adversarial
attack on a robust classification network?
To answer these questions, we design experiments to in-
vestigate which attribute values change when an image is
misclassified with increasing adversarial perturbations, and
further when the classifier is made robust against an ad-
versarial attack. Through these experiments we intend to
demonstrate what attributes are important to distinguish be-
tween the right and the wrong class. For instance, as shown
in Figure 1, “blue head” and ”red belly” associated with the
class “painted bunting” are predicted correctly for the clean
image. On the other hand, due to predicting attributes in-
correctly as “white belly” and “white head”, the adversarial
image gets classified into “herring gull” incorrectly. After
analysing the changes in attributes with a standard and with
a robust network we propose a metric to quantify the robust-
ness of the network against adversarial attacks. Therefore,
we ask
Can we quantify the robustness of an adversarially ro-
bust network?
In order to answer the third question, we design a ro-
bustness quantification metric for both standard as well as
attribute based classifiers.
To the best of our knowledge we are the first to exploit
adversarial examples with attributes to perform a system-
atic investigation on neural networks, both quantitatively
and qualitatively, for not only standard, but also for ad-
versarially robust networks. We explain the decisions of
deep computer vision systems by identifying what attributes
change when an image is perturbed in order for a classi-
fication system to produce a specific output. Our results
on three benchmark attribute datasets with varying size and
granularity elucidate why adversarial images get misclassi-
fied, and why the same images are correctly classified with
the adversarially robust framework. Finally we introduce a
new metric to quantify the robustness of a network for both
general as well as attribute based classifiers.
2. Related Work
In this section, we discuss related work on interpretabil-
ity and adversarial examples.
Interpretability. Explaining the output of a decision maker
is motivated by the need to build user trust before deploy-
ing them into the real world environment. Previous work
is broadly grouped into two: 1) rationalization, that is, jus-
tifying the network’s behavior and 2) introspective expla-
nation, that is, showing the causal relationship between in-
put and the specific output [8]. Text-based class discrimi-
native explanations [13, 22], text-based interpretation with
semantic information [7] and counter factual visual expla-
nations [12] fall in the first category. On the other hand
activation maximization [26, 37], learning the perturbation
mask [10], learning a model locally around its prediction
and finding important features by propagating activation
differences [23, 25] fall in the second group. The first group
has the benefit of being human understandable, but it lacks
the causal relationship between input and output. The sec-
ond group incorporates internal behavior of the network, but
lacks human understandability. In this work, we incorporate
human understandable justifications through attributes and
causal relationship between input and output through adver-
sarial attacks.
Interpretability of Adversarial Examples. After analyz-
ing neuronal activations of the networks for adversarial ex-
amples in [6] it was concluded that the networks learn re-
current discriminative parts of objects instead of semantic
meaning. In [14], the authors proposed a datapath visualiza-
tion module consisting of the layer level, feature level, and
the neuronal level visualizations of the network for clean
as well as adversarial images. In [35], the authors inves-
tigated adversarially trained convolutional neural networks
by constructing images with different textural transforma-
tions while preserving the shape information to verify the
shape bias in adversarially trained networks compared with
standard networks. Finally, in [31], the authors showed that
the saliency maps from adversarially trained networks align
well with human perception.
These approaches use saliency maps for interpreting the
adversarial examples, but saliency maps [24] are often weak
in justifying classification decisions, especially for fine-
grained adversarial images. For instance, in Figure 2 the
saliency map of a clean image classified into the ground
truth class, “red winged blackbird”, and the saliency map
of a misclassified adversarial image, look quite similar. In-
stead, we propose to predict and ground attributes for both
clean and adversarial images to provide visual as well as
attribute-based interpretations. In fact, our predicted at-
tributes for clean and adversarial images look quite differ-
ent. By grounding the predicted attributes one can infer that
the “orange wing” is important for “red winged blackbird”
while the “red head” is important for “red faced cormorant”.
Indeed, when the attribute value for orange wing decreases
and red head increases the image gets misclassified.
Adversarial Examples. Small carefully crafted perturba-
tions, called adversarial perturbations, when added to the
inputs of deep neural networks, result in adversarial exam-
ples. These adversarial examples can easily drive the clas-
sifiers to the wrong classification [29]. Such attacks involve
iterative fast gradient sign method (IFGSM) [17], Jacobian-
based saliency map attacks [21], one pixel attacks [27], Car-
lini and Wagner attacks [5] and universal attacks [20]. We
select IFGSM for our experiments, but our method can also
be used with other types of adversarial attacks.
Adversarial examples can also be used for understanding
neural networks. [4] aims at utilizing adversarial examples
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Figure 2. Adversarial images are difficult to explain: when the
answer is wrong, often saliency based methods (left) fail to detect
what went wrong. Instead, attributes (right) provide intuitive and
effective visual and textual explanations.
for understanding deep neural networks by extracting the
features that provide the support for classification into the
target class. The most salient features in the images provide
the way to interpret the decision of a classifier, but they lack
human understandability. Additionally, finding the most
salient features is computationally rather expensive. The
crucial point, however, is that if humans explain classifica-
tion by attributes, they are also natural candidates to study
misclassification and robustness. Hence, in this work in or-
der to understand neural networks we utilize adversarial ex-
amples with attributes which explain the misclassification
due to adversarial attacks.
3. Method
In this section, in order to explain what attributes change
when an adversarial attack is performed on the classifica-
tion mechanism of the network, we detail a two-step frame-
work. First, we perturb the images using adversarial attack
methods and robustify the classifiers via adversarial train-
ing. Second, we predict the class specific attributes and
visually ground them on the image to provide an intuitive
justification of why an image is classified as a certain class.
Finally, we introduce our metric for quantifying the robust-
ness of an adversarially robust network against adversarial
attacks.
3.1. Adversarial Attacks and Robustness
Given a clean n-th input xn and its respective ground
truth class yn predicted by a model f(xn), an adversarial
attack model generates an image xˆn for which the predicted
class is y, where y 6= yn. In the following, we detail an ad-
versarial attack method for fooling a general classifier and
an adversarial training technique that robustifies it.
Adversarial Attacks. The iterative fast gradient sign
method (IFGSM) [17] is leveraged to fool only the classifier
network. IFGSM solves the following equation to produce
adversarial examples:
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Figure 3. Interpretable attribute prediction-grounding model.
After an adversarial attack or adversarial training step, image fea-
tures of both clean θ(xn) and adversarial images θ(xˆ) are ex-
tracted using Resnet and mapped into attribute space φ(y) by
learning the compatibility function F (xn, yn;W ) between image
features and class attributes. Finally, attributes predicted by at-
tribute based classifier Aqxn,yn are grounded by matching them
with attributes predicted by Faster RCNN Ajxn for clean and ad-
versarial images.
xˆ0 = xn
xˆi+1n = Clip{xˆin + αSign(5xˆinL(xˆin, yn))} (1)
where 5xˆinL represents the gradient of the cost function
w.r.t. perturbed image xˆin at step i. α determines the step
size which is taken in the direction of sign of the gradient
and finally, the result is clipped by epsilon Clip.
Adversarial Robustness. We use adversarial training as
a defense against adversarial attacks which minimizes the
following objective [11]:
Ladv(xn, yn) = αL(xn, yn) + (1− α)L(xˆn, y) (2)
where, L(xn, yn) is the classification loss for clean images,
L(xˆn, y) is the loss for adversarial images and α regulates
the loss to be minimized. The model finds the worst case
perturbations and fine tunes the network parameters to re-
duce the loss on perturbed inputs. Hence, this results in a
robust network fr(xˆ), using which improves the classifica-
tion accuracy on the adversarial images.
3.2. Attribute Prediction and Grounding
Our attribute prediction and grounding model uses at-
tributes to define a joint embedding space that the images
are mapped to.
Attribute prediction. The model is shown in Figure 3.
During training our model maps clean training images close
to their respective class attributes, e.g. “painted bunting”
with attributes “red belly, blue head”, whereas adversarial
images get mapped close to a wrong class, e.g. “herring
gull” with attributes “white belly, white head”.
We employ structured joint embeddings (SJE) [1] to pre-
dict attributes in an image. Given the input image features
θ(xn) ∈ X and output class attributes φ(yn) ∈ Y from the
sample set S = {(θ(xn), φ(yn), n = 1...N} SJE learns a
mapping f : X → Y by minimizing the empirical risk of
the form 1N
∑N
n=1 ∆(yn, f(xn)) where ∆ : Y ×Y → R es-
timates the cost of predicting f(xn) when the ground truth
label is yn.
A compatibility function F : X × Y → R is defined
between input X and output Y space:
F (xn, yn;W ) = θ(xn)
TWφ(yn) (3)
Pairwise ranking loss L(xn, yn, y) is used to learn the pa-
rameters (W ):
∆(yn, y) + θ(xn)
TWφ(yn)− θ(xn)TWφ(y) (4)
Attributes are predicted for both clean and adversarial im-
ages by:
An,yn = θ(xn)W , Aˆn,y = θ(xˆn)W (5)
The image is assigned to the label of the nearest output class
attributes φ(yn).
Attribute grounding. In our final step, we ground the pre-
dicted attributes on to the input images using a pre-trained
Faster RCNN network and visualize them as in [3]. The
pre-trained Faster RCNN model F(xn) predicts the bound-
ing boxes denoted by bj . For each object bounding box it
predicts the class Yj as well as the attribute Aj [2].
bj ,Aj ,Yj = F(xn) (6)
where, j is the bounding box index. The most discrimi-
native attributes predicted by SJE are selected based on the
criteria that they change the most when the image is per-
turbed with noise. For clean images we use:
q = argmax
i
(Ain,yn − φ(yi)) (7)
and for adversarial images we use:
p = argmax
i
(Aˆin,y − φ(yin)). (8)
where i is the attribute index, q and p are the indexes
of the most discriminative attributes predicted by SJE and
φ(yi), φ(yin) are wrong class and ground truth class at-
tributes respectively. Then we search for selected attributes
Aqxn,yn ,A
p
xˆn,y
in attributes predicted by Faster RCNN for
each bounding box Ajxn ,A
j
xˆn
, and when the attributes pre-
dicted by SJE and Faster RCNN are found, that isAqxn,yn =
Ajxn , A
p
xˆn,y
= Ajxˆn we ground them on their respective
clean and adversarial images. Note that the adversarial im-
ages being used here are generated to fool only the gen-
eral classifier and not the attribute predictor nor the Faster
RCNN.
3.3. Robustness Quantification
To describe the ability of a network for robustification,
independent of its performance on a standard classifier we
introduce a metric called robust ratio. We calculate the loss
of accuracy LR on a robust classifier, by comparing a stan-
dard classifier f(xn) on clean images with the robust clas-
sifier fr(xˆn) on the adversarially perturbed images as given
below:
LR = f(xn)− fr(xˆn) (9)
And then we calculate the loss of accuracy LS on a stan-
dard classifier, by comparing its accuracy on the clean and
adversarially perturbed images:
LS = f(xn)− f(xˆn) (10)
The ability to robustify is then defined as:
R =
LR
LS
(11)
R is the robust ratio. It indicates the fraction of the classi-
fication accuracy of the standard classifier recovered by the
robust classifier when adding noise.
4. Experiments
In this section, we perform experiments on three differ-
ent datasets and analyse the change in attributes for clean as
well as adversarial images. We additionally analyse results
for our proposed robustness quantification metric on both
general and attribute based classifiers.
Datasets. We experiment on three datasets, Animals with
Attributes 2 (AwA) [18], Large attribute (LAD) [36] and
Caltech UCSD Birds (CUB) [33]. AwA contains 37322 im-
ages (22206 train / 5599 val / 9517 test) with 50 classes
and 85 attributes per class. LAD has 78017 images (40957
train / 13653 val / 23407 test) with 230 classes and 359 at-
tributes per class. CUB consists of 11,788 images (5395
train / 599 val / 5794 test) belonging to 200 fine-grained cat-
egories of birds with 312 attributes per class. All the three
datasets contain real valued class attributes representing the
presence of a certain attribute in a class.
Visual Genome Dataset [16] is used to train the Faster-
RCNN model which extracts the bounding boxes using
1600 object and 400 attribute annotations. Each bounding
box is associated with an attribute followed by the object,
e.g. a brown bird.
Image Features and Adversarial Examples. We extract
image features and generate adversarial images using the
fine-tuned Resnet-152. Adversarial attacks are performed
using IFGSM method with epsilon  values 0.01, 0.06 and
0.12. The l∞ norm is used as a similarity measure between
clean input and the generated adversarial example.
Adversarial Training. As for adversarial training, we re-
peatedly computed the adversarial examples while training
the fine-tuned Resnet-152 to minimize the loss on these ex-
amples. We generated adversarial examples using the pro-
jected gradient descent method. This is a multi-step variant
of FGSM with epsilon  values 0.01, 0.06 and 0.12 respec-
tively for adversarial training as in [19].
Note that we are not attacking the attribute based net-
work directly but we are attacking the general classifier and
extracting features from it for training the attribute based
classifier. Similarly, the adversarial training is also per-
formed on the general classifier and the features extracted
Figure 4. Comparing the accuracy of the general and the attribute based classifiers for adversarial examples to investigate change
in attributes. We evaluate both classifiers by extracting features from a standard network and the adversarially robust network.
from this model are used for training the attribute based
classifier.
Attribute Prediction and Grounding.
At test time the image features are projected onto the
attribute space. The image is assigned with the label of
the nearest ground truth attribute vector. The predicted at-
tributes are grounded by using Faster-RCNN pre-trained on
Visual Genome Dataset since we do not have ground truth
part bounding boxes for any of attribute datasets.
5. Results
We investigate the change in attributes quantitatively (i)
by performing classification based on attributes and (ii)
by computing distances between attributes in embedding
space. We additionally investigate changes qualitatively by
grounding the attributes on images for both standard and
adversarially robust networks.
At first, we compare the general classifier f(xn) and the
attribute based classifier f(xn) in terms of the classifica-
tion accuracy on clean images. Since the attribute based
model is a more explainable classifier, it predicts attributes,
compared to general classifier, which predicts the class la-
bel directly. Therefore, we first verify whether the attribute
based classifier performs equally well as the general clas-
sifier. We find that, the attribute based and general clas-
sifier accuracies are comparable for AWA (general: 93.53,
attribute based: 93.83). The attribute based classifier ac-
curacy is slightly higher for LAD (general: 80.00, attribute
based: 82.77), and slightly lower for CUB (general: 81.00,
attribute based: 76.90) dataset.
To qualitatively analyse the predicted attributes, we
ground them on clean and adversarial images. We select
our images among the ones that are correctly classified
when clean and incorrectly classified when adversarially
perturbed. Further we select the most discriminative at-
tributes based on equation 7 and 8. We evaluate 50 attributes
that change their value the most for the CUB, 50 attributes
for the AWA, and 100 attributes for the LAD dataset.
AWA CUB
Standard Network
Figure 5. Attribute distance plots for standard learning frame-
works. Standard learning framework plots are shown for the clean
and the adversarial image attributes.
5.1. Adversarial Attacks on Standard Network
5.1.1 Quantitative Analysis
By Performing Classification based on Attributes. With
adversarial attacks, the accuracy of both the general and at-
tribute based classifiers drops with the increase in perturba-
tions see Figure 4 (blue curves). The drop in accuracy of the
general classifier for the fine grained CUB dataset is higher
as compared to the coarse AWA dataset which confirms our
hypothesis. For example, at  = 0.01 for the CUB dataset
the general classifier’s accuracy drops from 81% to 31%
(≈ 50% drop), while for the AWA dataset it drops from
93.53% to 70.54% (≈ 20% drop). However, the drop in
accuracy with the attribute based classifier is almost equal
for both, ≈ 20% . We propose one of the reasons behind
the smaller drop of accuracy for the CUB dataset with the
attribute based classifier compared to the general classifier
is that for fine grained datasets there are many common at-
tributes among classes. Therefore, in order to misclassify an
image a significant number of attributes need to be changed.
For a coarse grained dataset, changing a few attributes is
sufficient for misclassification. Another reason is that there
are 9% more attributes per class in the CUB dataset as com-
pared to the AWA dataset.
For the coarse dataset the attribute based classifier shows
comparable performance with the general classifier. While
for the fine grained dataset the attribute based classifier
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Figure 6. Qualitative analysis for adversarial attacks on standard network. The attributes ranked by importance for the classification
decision are shown below the images. The grounded attributes are color coded for visibility (the ones in gray could not be grounded). The
attributes for clean images are related to the ground truth classes whereas the ones predicted for adversarial images are related to the wrong
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Robust Network
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Figure 7. Attribute distance plots for robust learning frame-
works. Robust learning framework plots are shown only for the
adversarial image attributes but for adversarial images misclassi-
fied with the standard features and correctly classified with the
robust features.
shows better performance than the general classifier so a
large change in attributes is required to cause misclassifica-
tion with attributes. Overall, the drop in the accuracy with
the adversarial attacks demonstrates that, with adversarial
perturbations, the attribute values change towards those that
belong to the new class and cause the misclassification.
By Computing Distances in Embedding Space. In order
to perform analysis on attributes in embedding space, we
consider the images which are correctly classified without
perturbations and misclassified with perturbations. Further,
we select the top 20% of the most discriminative attributes
using equation 7 and 8. Our aim is to analyse the change in
attributes in embedding space.
We contrast the Euclidean distance between predicted at-
tributes of clean and adversarial samples:
d1 = d{An,yn , Aˆn,y} =‖ An,yn − Aˆn,y ‖2 (12)
with the Euclidean distance between the ground truth at-
tribute vector of the correct and wrong classes:
d2 = d{φ(yn), φ(y)} =‖ φ(yn)− φ(y)) ‖2 (13)
and show the results in Figure 5. Where,An,yn denotes the
predicted attributes for the clean images classified correctly,
and Aˆn,y denotes the predicted attributes for the adversar-
ial images misclassified with a standard network. The cor-
rect ground truth class attribute is referred to as φ(yn) and
wrong class attributes are φ(y).
We observe that for the AWA dataset the distances be-
tween the predicted attributes for adversarial and clean im-
ages d1 are smaller than the distances between the ground
truth attributes of the respective classes d2. The closeness
in predicted attributes for clean and adversarial images as
compared to their ground truths shows that attributes change
towards the wrong class but not completely. This is due to
the fact that for coarse classes, only a small change in at-
tribute values is sufficient to change the class.
The fine-grained CUB dataset behaves differently. The
overlap between d1 and d2 distributions demonstrates
that attributes of images belonging to fine-grained classes
change significantly as compared to images from coarse
categories. Although the fine grained classes are closer to
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Figure 8. Qualitative analysis for adversarial attacks on robust network. The attributes are ranked by importance for the classification
decision, the grounded attributes are color coded for visibility (the ones in gray could not be grounded). The attributes for adversarial
images with robust network are related to ground truth classes whereas the ones predicted for adversarial images change towards wrong
classes
each other, due to the existence of many common attributes
among fine grained classes, attributes need to change sig-
nificantly to cause misclassification. Hence, for the coarse
dataset, the attributes change minimally, while for the fine
grained dataset they change significantly.
5.1.2 Qualitative Analysis
We observe in Figure 6 that the most discriminative at-
tributes for the clean images are coherent with the ground
truth class and are localized accurately; however, for adver-
sarial images they are coherent with the wrong class. Those
attributes which are common among both clean and adver-
sarial classes are localized correctly on the adversarial im-
ages; however, the attributes which are not related to the
ground truth class, the ones that are related to the wrong
class can not get grounded as there is no visual evidence
that supports the presence of these attributes. For example
“brown wing, long wing, long tail” attributes are common in
both classes; hence, they are present both in the clean image
and the adversarial image. On the other hand, “has a brown
color” and “a multicolored breast” are related to the wrong
class and are not present in the adversarial image. Hence,
they can not be grounded. Similarly, in the second exam-
ple none of the attributes are grounded. This is because
attributes changed completely towards the wrong class and
the evidence for those attributes is not present in the im-
age. This indicates that attributes for the clean images cor-
respond to the ground truth class and for adversarial images
correspond to the wrong class. Additionally, only those
attributes common among both the wrong and the ground
truth classes get grounded on adversarial images.
Similarly, our results on the LAD and AWA datasets in
the second row of Figure 6 show that the grounded attributes
on clean images confirm the classification into the ground
truth class while the attributes grounded on adversarial im-
ages are common among clean and adversarial images. For
instance, in the first example of AWA, the “is black” at-
tribute is common in both classes so it is grounded on both
images, but “has claws” is an important attribute for the ad-
versarial class. As it is not present in the ground truth class,
it is not grounded.
Compared to misclassifications caused by adversarial
perturbations on CUB, images do not necessarily get mis-
classified into the most similar class for the AWA and LAD
datasets as they are coarse grained datasets. Therefore,
there is less overlap of attributes between ground truth and
adversarial classes, which is in accordance with our quanti-
tative results. Furthermore, the attributes for both datasets
are not highly structured, as different objects can be distin-
guished from each other with only a small number of at-
tributes.
5.2. Adversarial Attacks on Robust Network
5.2.1 Quantitative Analysis
By Performing Classification based on Attributes. Our
evaluation on the standard and adversarially robust net-
works shows that the classification accuracy improves for
the adversarial images when adversarial training is used to
robustify the network: 4 (purple curves). For example, in
Figure 4 for AWA the accuracy of the general classifier im-
proved from 70.54% to 92.15% (≈ 21% improvement) for
adversarial attack with  = 0.01. As expected for the fine
grained CUB dataset the improvement is≈ 31% higher than
the AWA dataset. However, for the attribute based classi-
fier, the improvement in accuracy for AWA (≈ 18.06%) is
almost double that of the CUB dataset (≈ 7%). We pro-
pose this is because the AWA dataset is coarse, so in order
to classify an adversarial image correctly to its ground truth
class, a small change in attributes is sufficient. Conversely
the fine grained CUB dataset requires a large change in at-
tribute values to correctly classify an adversarial image into
its ground truth class. Additionally, CUB contains 9% more
per class attributes. For a coarse AWA dataset the attributes
Figure 9. Ability to robustify a network. Ability to robustify a network with increasing adversarial perturbations is shown for three
different datasets for both general and attribute based classifiers.
change back to the correct class and represent the correct
class accurately. While for the fine grained CUB dataset, a
large change in attribute values is required to correctly clas-
sify images.
This shows that with a robust network, the change in at-
tribute values for adversarial images indicate to the ground
truth class, resulting in better performance. Overall, we ob-
serve by analysing attribute based classifier accuracy that
with the adversarial attacks the change in attribute values
indicates in which wrong class it is assigned and with the
robust network the change in attribute values indicates to-
wards the ground truth class.
By Computing Distances in Embedding Space
We compare the distances between the predicted at-
tributes of only adversarial images that are classified cor-
rectly with the help of an adversarially robust network
Aˆrn,yn and classified incorrectly with a standard network
Aˆn,y:
d1 = d{Aˆrn,yn , Aˆn,y} =‖ Aˆrn,yn − Aˆn,y ‖2 (14)
with the distances between the ground truth target class at-
tributes φ(yn) and ground truth wrong class attributes φ(y):
d2 = d{φ(yn), φ(y)} =‖ φ(yn)− φ(y)) ‖2 (15)
The results are shown in Figure 7. By comparing Figure 7
with Figure 5 we observe a similar behavior. The plots in
Figure 5 are plotted between clean and adversarial image
attributes. While plots in Figure 7 are plotted between only
adversarial images but classified correctly with an adversar-
ially robust network and misclassified with a standard net-
work. This shows that the adversarial images classified cor-
rectly with a robust network behave like clean images, i.e. a
robust network predicts attributes for the adversarial images
which are closer to their ground truth class.
5.2.2 Qualitative Analysis
Finally, our analysis with correctly classified images by the
adversarially robust network shows that adversarial images
with the robust network behave like clean images also vi-
sually. In the Figure 8, we observe that the attributes of
an adversarial image with a standard network are closer
to the adversarial class attributes. However, the grounded
attributes of adversarial image with a robust network are
closer to its ground truth class. For instance, the first exam-
ple contains a “blue head” and a “black wing” whereas one
of the most discriminating properties of the ground truth
class “blue head” is not relevant to the adversarial class.
Hence this attribute is not predicted as the most relevant by
our model, and thus our attribute grounder did not ground
it. This shows that the attributes for adversarial images clas-
sified correctly with the robust network are in accordance
with the ground truth class and hence get grounded on the
adversarial images.
5.3. Analysis for Robustness Quantification
The results for our proposed robustness quantification
metric are shown in Figure 9. We observe that the abil-
ity to robustify a network against adversarial attacks varies
for different datasets. The network with fine grained CUB
dataset is easy to robustify as compared to coarse AWA and
LAD datasets. For the general classifier as expected the
ability to robustify the network increases with the increase
in noise. For the attribute based classifier the ability to ro-
bustify the network is high with the small noise but it drops
as the noise increases (at  = 0.06) and then again increases
at high noise value (at  = 0.12).
6. Conclusion
In this work we conducted a systematic study on under-
standing the neural networks by exploiting adversarial ex-
amples with attributes. We showed that if a noisy sample
gets misclassified then its most discriminative attribute val-
ues indicate to which wrong class it is assigned. On the
other hand, if a noisy sample is correctly classified with the
robust network then the most discriminative attribute values
indicate towards the ground truth class. Finally, we pro-
posed a metric for quantifying the robustness of a network
and showed that the ability to robustify a network varies for
different datasets. Overall the ability to robustify a network
increases with the increase in adversarial perturbations.
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